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What confirmation mess?
Stephen Carter's new book decries the state of the confirmation process, especially for Supreme Court nominees. "The confirmation mess," in Carter's (noninterrogatory) phrase, consists of
both the brutalization and the politicization of the process by
which the nation selects its highest judges. That process, Carter
insists, is replete with meanness, dishonesty, and distortion.
More, and worse, it demands of nominees that they reveal their
views on important legal issues, thus threatening to limit the
Court "to people who have adequately demonstrated their closedmindedness" (p xi). A misguided focus on the results of controversial cases and on the probable voting patterns of would-be Justices, Carter argues, produces a noxious and destructive process.
Carter's paradigm case, almost needless to say, is the failed nomination of Robert Bork.
But to observers of more recent nominations to the Supreme
Court, Carter's description must seem antiquated. President
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Clinton's nominees, then-Judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, confronted no unfair or nasty opposition; to the
contrary, their confirmation hearings became official lovefests.
More important, both nominees felt free to decline to disclose
their views on controversial issues and cases. They stonewalled
the Judiciary Committee to great effect, as senators greeted their
"nonanswer" answers with equanimity and resigned good humor.
And even before the confirmation process became quite so cozy
(which is to say, even before the turn toward nominating wellknown and well-respected moderates), the practice to which Carter most objects-the discussion of a nominee's views on legal
issues-had almost completely lapsed. Justices Kennedy, Souter,
and Thomas, no less than Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, rebuffed
all attempts to explore their opinions of important principles and
cases. Professor Carter, it seems, wrote his book too late. Where,
today, is the confirmation mess he laments?
The recent hearings on Supreme Court nominees, though,
suggest another question: might we now have a distinct and
more troubling confirmation mess? If recent hearings lacked acrimony, they also lacked seriousness and substance. The problem
was the opposite of what Carter describes: not that the Senate
focused too much on a nominee's legal views, but that it did so
far too little. Otherwise put, the current "confirmation mess"
derives not from the role the Senate assumed in evaluating
Judge Bork, but from the Senate's subsequent abandonment of
that role and function. When the Senate ceases to engage nominees in meaningful discussion of legal issues, the confirmation
process takes on an air of vacuity and farce, and the Senate becomes incapable of either properly evaluating nominees or appropriately educating the public. Whatever imperfections may have
attended the Bork hearings pale in comparison with these recent
failures. Out, then, with the new mess and in with the old!'
I.

CARTER'S CRITIQUE

Carter depicts a confirmation process out of control-a process in which we attend to the wrong things in the wrong manner, in which we abjure reasoned dialogue about qualifications in
favor of hysterical rantings about personalities and politics. Car' And no, I haven't changed my mind since, several months after I drafted this
Review, the Senate turned Republican and Orrin Hatch assumed the chairmanship of the
Judiciary Committee. The conclusion of this Review still holds--even if I am no longer
quite so sanguine about it.
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ter is no partisan in this description; he blames Republicans and
Democrats, right and left alike (pp 10, 142). Similarly, Carter
takes no sides as between the President and the Senate; he assumes that both ought to evaluate judicial candidates by the
same criteria and argues that both have performed poorly this
evaluative function (pp 29-30). Carter views the current mess as
having deep roots. He refers often to the attempt of segregationist senators to defeat the nomination of Thurgood Marshall (pp
62-63) and describes as well some yet more distant confirmation
battles (pp 65-73). Although he focuses on the nomination and
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, he buttresses his case
with discussion of the recent travails of Lani Guinier (pp 37-44)
and Zoe Baird (pp 25-28). Always, though, the face in the foreground is Robert Bork's. Carter's understanding of the Bork hearings informs-sometimes explicitly, sometimes not-the whole of
his argument and analysis.
Carter identifies two cardinal flaws in the confirmation process. The first concerns the absence of "honesty" and "decency" (p
ix). Here Carter laments the deterioration of public debate over
nominations into "the intellectual equivalent of a barroom brawl"
(p x). He catalogues the ways in which opponents demonize nominees and distort their records, referring to the many apparently
purposeful misreadings of the writings of Robert Bork (pp 45-52)
and Lani Guinier (pp 39-44). He describes the avid search for
disqualifying factors, whether of a personal kind (for example,
illegal nannies) or of a professional nature (for example, ill-conceived footnotes in scholarly articles) (pp 25, 42-43). He deplores
"smears" and "soundbites" (p 206)-the way in which media coverage turns nominations into extravaganzas, the extent to which
public relations strategy becomes all-important. And in a semimystical manner, he castigates our refusal to forgive sin, accept
redemption, and acknowledge the complexity of human beings,
including those nominated to high office (pp 183-84).
The second vice of the confirmation process, according to
Carter, lies in its focus on a nominee's probable future voting
record. In Carter's portrayal, the President, Senate, press, interest groups, and public all evaluate nominees primarily by plumbing their views on controversial legal issues, such as the death
penalty or abortion (pp 54-56). Carter's paradigmatic case, again,
is Robert Bork, a judge of superior objective qualifications whose
views on constitutional method and issues led to the defeat of his
nomination. Carter is "struck" by the failure of participants in
the Bork hearings to consider "that trying to get him to tell the
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nation how he would vote on controversial cases if confirmed
might pose a greater long-run danger to the Republic than confirming him" (p x). This danger, Carter avers, arises from the
damage such inquiry does to judicial independence. Examination
of a nominee's views on contested constitutional matters, Carter
claims, gives the public too great a chance to influence how the
judiciary will decide these issues, precisely by enabling the public
to reject a nominee on grounds of substance (p 115). At the same
time, such inquiry undermines the eventual Justice's ability (and
the public's belief in the Justice's ability) to decide cases impartially, based on the facts at issue and the arguments presented,
rather than on the Justice's prior views or commitments (p 56).
The failures of the confirmation process, Carter urges, ultimately have less to do with rules and procedures than with public "attitudes"--specifically, "our attitudes toward the Court as an
institution and the work it does for the society" (p 188). We view
the Court as a dispenser of decisions-as to individual cases of
course, but also as to hotly disputed public issues. Our evaluation
of the Court coincides with our evaluation of the results it
reaches (p 57). Because we see the Court in terms of results, we
yearn to pack it with Justices who will always arrive at the
"right" decisions. And because the decisions of the Court indeed
have consequence, we feel justified, as we pursue this project, in
resorting to "shameless exaggeration" and misleading rhetoric (p
51). The key to change, according to Carter, lies in viewing the
Court in a different-a more "mundane and lawyerly"-manner
(p 206). And although Carter is unclear on the point, this seems
to mean judging the Court less in terms of the results it reaches
than in terms of its level of skill and craftsmanship.
In keeping with this analysis, Carter advocates a return to
confirmation proceedings that focus on a nominee's technical
qualifications-in other words, his legal aptitude, skills, and
experience (pp 161-62). At times, Carter suggests that this set of
qualifications constitutes the only proper criterion of judgment
(pp 187-88). But Carter in the end draws back from this position,
which he admits would provide no lever to oppose a nominee,
otherwise qualified, who wished to overturn a case like Brown v
Board2 (pp 119-21). Carter urges, as a safeguard against extremism of this kind, an inquiry into whether a nominee subscribes to
the "firm moral consensus" of society (p 121). The Senate, Carter
writes, should resolve this question by "undertak[ing] moral
2

Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954).
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inquiry, both into the world view of the nominee and, if necessary, into the nominee's conduct" (p 124). This inquiry, in other
words, would involve a determination of whether a nominee has
the "right moral instincts" and whether his "personal moral decisions seem generally sound" (p 152). Carter views this inquiry as
wholly distinct from an approach that asks about a nominee's
legal views or philosophy (id). He suggests, for example, that the
Senate ask a nominee not whether discriminatory private clubs
violate the Constitution, but whether "the nominee has belonged
to a club with such policies" (id). An assessment of moral judgment alone, independent of legal judgment, would combine with
an evaluation of legal aptitude to form Carter's ideal confirmation process.
II. CURRENT EVENTS
Does Carter's critique of the confirmation process ring true?
It might have done so eight years ago. It ought not to do so now.
Carter tries to update his book, to make it more than a comment on the Bork proceedings. He invokes the nomination, eventually withdrawn, of Lani Guinier to serve as Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights (pp 37-44). Consider, Carter implores us,
the distortion of Guinier's academic work, initially by her many
enemies, finally and fatally by some she thought friends. Do not
the exaggeration, name-calling, and hyperbole that surrounded
the discussion of Guinier's views prove the existence of a confirmation mess? And Carter then invokes the battle over the nomination of Clarence Thomas to serve as a Supreme Court Justice
(pp 138-42). Recall, Carter tells us (and it is not hard to do), the
intensity and wrath surrounding that battle-the fury with
which the partisans of Thomas and Anita Hill, respectively, exchanged charge and countercharge and bloodied previously unsullied reputations. Does not this episode, this display of raw emotion and this unrelenting focus on personal traits and behavior,
demonstrate again the existence of a confirmation mess?
Well, no-not on either count, at least if the term "confirmation mess" signifies a problem both specific to and common
among confirmation battles. Carter is right to note the distortions
in the debate over Guinier's prior writings; but he is wrong to
think they derived from a special attribute of the confirmation
process. It is unfortunate but true that distortions of this kind
mar public debate on all important issues. Professor Carter, meet
Harry and Louise; they may convince you that the Guinier episode is less a part of a confirmation mess than of a -government
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mess, the sources and effects of which lie well beyond your book's
purview. And the Thomas incident, proposed as exemplar or
parable, suffers from the converse flaw. That incident is unique
among confirmation hearings and, with any reasonable amount of
luck, will remain so. The way the Senate handled confidential
charges of a devastating nature on a subject at a fault line of
contemporary culture reveals very little about the broader confirmation process.
Indeed, Carter's essential critique of the confirmation process-that it focuses too much on the nominee's views on disputed legal issues-applies neither to the Guinier episode nor to the
Thomas hearings. Carter concedes that the Senate ought to inquire into the views and policies of nominees to the executive
branch, for whom "independence" is no virtue (p 32). The public
debate over Guinier's articles (problems of distortion to one side)
thus fails to implicate Carter's concern with the focus of the process on legal issues. And so too of the Thomas hearings. Carter's
own description of the "mess" surrounding that nomination highlights the Senate's inquiry into the charges of sexual harassment
and not its investigation of the nominee's legal opinions (pp 13345). The emphasis is not surprising. No one can remember the
portion of the hearings devoted to Justice Thomas's legal views,
and for good reason: Justice Thomas, or so he assured us, already
had "stripped down like a runner" and so had none to speak of.'
The apparent "mess" of the Thomas hearings thus arose not from
the exploration of legal philosophy that Carter abjures, but instead from the inquiry into moral practice and principle that he
recoinmends to the Senate as an alternative.4
What, then, of the "confirmation mess" as Carter defines
it-the threat to judicial independence resulting from a misplaced focus on the nominee's legal views and philosophy?
Lacking support for his argument in the recent controversies
surrounding Guinier and Thomas, Carter must recede to the
Bork hearings for a paradigm. But time has overtaken this illustration: no subsequent nomination fits Carter's Bork-based model

' Clarence Thomas, as quoted in Linda Greenhouse, The Thomas Hearings: In
Trying to Clarify What He Is Not, Thomas Opens Questions of What He Is, NY Times A19
(Sept 13, 1991).
4 The same is true of the controversy surrounding the nomination of Zoe Baird as
Attorney General. As Carter discusses, Baird's nomination ran into trouble because she
had hired illegal immigrants and then failed to pay social security taxes on their salaries
(pp 25-28). Here, too, the dispute arose from an inquiry into the nominee's personal
conduct, rather than her views and policies.
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any better than do the nominations of Guinier or Thomas. Not
since Bork (as Carter himself admits) has any nominee candidly
discussed, or felt a need to discuss, his or her views and philosophy (pp 57-59). It is true that in recent hearings senators of all
stripes have proclaimed their prerogative to explore a nominee's
approach to constitutional problems. The idea of substantive
inquiry is accepted today to a far greater extent than it was a
decade ago.5 But the practice of substantive inquiry has suffered
a precipitous fall since the Bork hearings, so much so that today
it hardly deserves the title "practice" at all. To demonstrate this
point, it is only necessary to review the recent hearings of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer-one occurring before, the
other after, publication of Carter's book. Consider the way these
then-judges addressed issues of substance and then ask of what
Carter's "confirmation mess" in truth consists.
Justice Ginsburg's favored technique took the form of a pincer movement. When asked a specific question on a constitutional
issue, Ginsburg replied (along Carter's favored lines) that an
answer might forecast a vote and thus contravene the norm of
judicial impartiality. Said Ginsburg: "I think when you ask me
about specific cases, I have to say that I am not going to give an
advisory opinion on any specific scenario, because.., that scenario might come before me."6 But when asked a more general
question, Ginsburg replied that a judge could deal in specifics
only; abstractions, even hypotheticals, took the good judge beyond
her calling. Again said Ginsburg: "I prefer not to... talk in
grand terms about principles that have to be applied in concrete
cases. I like to reason from the specific case."7 Some room may
have remained in theory between these two responses; perhaps a
senator could learn something about Justice Ginsburg's legal

' Senator Joseph Biden made this point near the beginning of the Ginsburg hearings. After listening, in turn, to Senators Hatch, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, and Simpson
expound on the need to question the nominee about her judicial philosophy, Senator
Biden said: "I might note it is remarkable that seven years ago the hearing we had here
was somewhat more controversial, and I made a speech that mentioned the 'p' word,

philosophy, that we should examine the philosophy, and most... said that was not
appropriate. At least we have crossed that hurdle. No one is arguing that anymore."
Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 1st
Sess 21 (July 20-23, 1993) ("Confirmation Hearings for Ginsburg").

Id at 184.
' Id at 180. See also id at 333 ("I can't answer an abstract issue. I work from a
specific case based on the record of that case, the briefs that are presented, the parties'
6

presentations, and decide the case in light of that record, those briefs. I simply cannot,

even in areas that I know very well, answer an issue abstracted from a concrete case.").
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views if he pitched his question at precisely the right level of
generality. But in practice, the potential gap closed to a sliver
given Ginsburg's understanding of what counted as "too specific"
(roughly, anything that might have some bearing on a case that
might some day come before the Court) and what counted as "too
general" (roughly, anything else worthy of mention).
So, for example, in a colloquy with Senator Feinstein on the
Second Amendment, Ginsburg first confronted the question
whether she agreed with a fifty-four-year-old Supreme Court
precedent 8 on the subject and with the interpretation that lower
courts unanimously had given it. Replied Ginsburg: "The last
time the Supreme Court spoke to this question was 1939. You
summarized what that was, and you also summarized the state
of law in the lower courts. But this is a question that may well
be before the Court again... and because of where I sit it would
be inappropriate for me to say anything more than that."9 The
Senator continued: if the Judge could not discuss a particular
case, even one decided fifty years ago, could the Judge say something about "the methodology [she] might apply" and "the factors
[she] might look at" in determining the validity of that case or
the meaning of the Second Amendment?" "I wish I could Senator," Ginsburg replied, "but ... apart from the specific context I
really can't expound on it."" "Why not?" the Senator might have
asked. Because the question functioned at too high a level of
abstraction: "I would have to consider, as I have said many times
today, the specific case, the briefs and the arguments that would
be made." 2 Many times indeed. So concluded a typical exchange
in the confirmation hearing of Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Breyer was smoother than Justice Ginsburg, but
ultimately no more forthcoming. His favored approach was the
"grey area" test: if a question fell within this area-if it asked
him to comment on issues not yet definitively closed (and therefore still a matter of interest)-he must, he said, decline to comment." Like Justice Ginsburg, he could provide personal anec8 United States v Miller, 307 US 174 (1939).
Confirmation Hearings for Ginsburg at 241-42 (cited in note 5).
"

Id at 242.

Id.
Id.
' Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 85
(July 12, 1994) (Miller Reporting transcript). Sometimes Justice Breyer referred to this
test as the "up in the air" test. So, for example, when Chairman Biden asked him to
comment on the burden imposed on the government to sustain economic regulation,
12
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dotes-the relevance of which were open to question. He could
state settled law-but not whether he agreed with the settlement. He could explain the importance and difficulty of a legal
issue-without suggesting which important and difficult resolution he favored. What he could not do was to respond directly to
questions regarding his legal positions. Throughout his testimony, Breyer refused to answer not merely questions concerning
pending cases, but questions relating in any way to any issue
that the Supreme Court might one day face.
I do not mean to overstate the case; Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer did provide snippets of information. Both Justices
discussed with candor and enthusiasm issues on which they
previously had written. So the Judiciary Committee and public
alike learned much about Justice Ginsburg's current views on
gender discrimination and abortion and about Justice Breyer's
thoughts on regulatory policy. Both Justices, too, allowed an
occasional glimpse of what might be termed, with some slight
exaggeration, a judicial philosophy. A close observer of the hearings thus might have made a quick sketch of Justice Ginsburg as
a cautious, incrementalist common lawyer and of Justice Breyer
as an antiformalist problem solver. (But how much of this sketch
in fact would have derived from preconceptions of the Justices,
based on their judicial opinions and scholarly articles?) If most of
the testimony disclosed only the insignificant and the obvious--did anyone need to hear on no less than three separate
occasions that Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Dred Scott?' 4-a
small portion revealed something of the nominee's conception of
judging.
Neither do I mean to deride Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
for the approach each took to testifying. I am sure each believed
(along with Carter) that disclosing his or her views on legal issues threatened the independence of the judiciary. (It is a view, I
suspect, which for obvious reasons is highly correlated with membership in the third branch of government. 5 ) More, I am sure

Breyer noted that "this is a matter... still up in the air." When the Chairman replied
"[t]hat is why I am trying to get you to talk about it, because you may bring it down to
the ground," Justice Breyer repeated that "I have a problem talking about things that are
up in the air." Id at 55 (July 12, 1994).
" Dred Scott v Sanford, 60 US 393 (1856). See, for example, Confirmation Hearings
for Ginsburg at 126, 188, 270 (cited in note 5).
"5 In 1959, lawyer William Rehnquist wrote an article criticizing the Senate's consideration of the nomination of Charles Evans Whittaker to the Supreme Court. The Senate,
he stated, had "succeeded in adducing only the following facts:... proceeds from skunk
trapping in rural Kansas assisted him in obtaining his early education;... he was the
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both judges knew that they were playing the game in full accordance with a set of rules that others had established before them.
If most prior nominees have avoided disclosing their views on
legal issues, it is hard to fault Justice Ginsburg or Justice Breyer
for declining to proffer this information. And finally, I suspect
that both appreciated that, for them (as for most), the safest and
surest route to the prize lay in alternating platitudinous statement and judicious silence. Who would have done anything different, in the absence of pressure from members of Congress?
And of such pressure, there was little evidence. To be sure,
an occasional senator complained of the dearth of substantive
comment, most vocally during the preternaturally controlled
testimony of Justice Ginsburg. Chairman Biden and Senator
Spector in particular expressed impatience with the game as
played. Spector warned that the Judiciary Committee one day
would "rear up on its hind legs" and reject a nominee who refused to answer questions, for that reason only (p 54). And Biden
lamented that no "nominee would ever satisfy me in terms of
being as expansive about their views as I would like."" But for
the most part, the senators acceded to the reticence of the nominees before them with good grace and humor. Senator Simon
sympathetically commented to Justice Breyer: "You are in a situation today.., where you do not want to offend any of us, and I
understand that. I hope the time will come when you may think
it appropriate... to speak out on this issue."" Senator
DeConcini similarly remarked to Justice Ginsburg that it was
"fim" and "intellectually challenging"-a sort of chess game in
real life-for a senator to "try[ I to get inside the mind of a nominee.., without violating their oath and their potential conflicts. . . ."" And of course no one voted against either nominee

first Missourian ever appointed to the Supreme Court; [and] since he had been born in
Kansas but now resided in Missouri, his nomination honored two states." William
Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, Harv L Rec 7, 8 (Oct 8, 1959).
Rehnquist specifically complained about the Senate's failure to ask Justice Whittaker
about his views on equal protection and due process. Id at 10. By 1986, when he appeared
before the Senate Judiciary Committee as a sitting Associate Justice and a nominee for
Chief Justice, Rehnquist had changed his mind about the propriety of such inquiries.
16 Confirmation Hearings for Ginsburg at 259 (cited in note 5). In a similar vein,
Senator Cohen accused Justice Ginsburg of resorting to "delphic ambiguity" in her responses. Senator Cohen recalled the story of the general who asked the oracle what would
occur if he (the general) invaded Greece. When the oracle responded that a great army
would fall, the general mounted the invasion-only to discover that the great army to
which the oracle had referred was his own. See id at 220.
z Confirmation Hearings for Breyer at 77-78 (July 13, 1994) (cited in note 13).
' Confirmation Hearings for Ginsburg at 330 (cited in note 5).

1995]

Confirmation Messes, Old and New

929

on the ground that he or she had declined to answer questions
relating to important legal issues.
The ease of these proceedings in part reflected the nature of
both the nominations and the political context. First replace
divided government with single-party control of the White House
and Senate. Now posit a President with an ambitious legislative
agenda, requiring him to retain support in Congress, but with no
judicial agenda to speak of. 9 Assume, as a result, that this
President nominates two clear moderates, known and trusted by
leading senators of both the majority and the minority parties.
Throw in that each nominee is a person of extraordinary ability
and distinction. Finally, add that the Court's rulings on some of
the hot-button issues of recent times-most notably abortion, but
also school prayer and the death penalty-today seem relatively
stable. This is a recipe-now proved successful-for confirmation
order, exactly opposite to the state of anarchy depicted by Carter.
At the least, this suggests what David Strauss has argued in
another review of Carter's book:20 that the culprit in Carter's
story is nothing so grand and seemingly timeless as the American public's attitudes toward the courts; that the cause of
Carter's "mess" is the simple attempt of the Reagan and Bush
administrations to impose an ideologically charged vision of the
judiciary in an unsympathetic political climate.
But even this view overstates the longevity of the "confirmation mess," as Carter defines it. That so-called mess in fact ended
long before President Clinton's nominations; it ended right after
it began, with the defeat of the nomination of Robert Bork. The
Senate overwhelmingly approved the nominations of Justices
Kennedy and Souter after they gave testimony (or rather,
nontestimony) similar in almost all respects to that of Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer.2 This was so even though the Senate
knew little about Justice Kennedy and still less about Justice

19 See David A. Strauss, Whose Confirmation Mess?, Am Prospect 91, 96 (Summer
1994), reviewing Carter, The Confirmation Mess. Herein lies one of the mysteries of
modern confirmation politics: given that the Republican Party has an ambitious judicial
agenda and the Democratic Party has next to none, why is the former labeled the party of
judicial restraint and the latter the party of judicial activism?

Id at 92, 95-96.

Prior to nominating Justice Kennedy, the Reagan White House nominated Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, only soon to withdraw the nomination. The decision to pull the nomination followed revelations about Judge Ginsburg's prior use of marijuana. Carter barely
mentions this nomination. Carter, however, generally considers the prior illegal conduct of
a nominee to be a meet subject for investigation, although not necessarily a sufficient
reason for disqualification (pp 169-77).
21
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Souter prior to the hearings-an ignorance which should have
increased the importance of their testimony. (Just ask Senator
Hatch whether he now wishes he had insisted that Justice
Souter be more forthcoming.) The Senate also confirmed the
nomination of Justice Thomas after his substantive testimony
had become a national laughingstock. Take away the weakness of
Justice Thomas's objective qualifications and the later charges of
sexual harassment (inquiry into which Carter approves), and the
Justice's Pinpoint, Georgia, testimonial strategy would have
produced a solid victory.2 This history offers scant support for
Carter's lamentation that the confirmation process has become focused on a nominee's substantive testimony and obsessed with
the nominee's likely voting record. So what, excepting once again
Robert Bork, is Carter complaining about?
If Carter is right as to what makes a "confirmation mess," he
had no reason to write this book-or at least to write it when he
did. Senators today do not insist that any nominee reveal what
kind of Justice she would make, by disclosing her views on important legal issues. Senators have not done so since the
hearings on the nomination of Judge Bork. They instead engage
in a peculiar ritual dance, in which they propound their own
views on constitutional law, but neither hope nor expect the
nominee to respond in like manner. Under Carter's criteria, this
process ought to count as nothing more than a harmless charade,
not as a problem of any real import. It is only if Carter's criteria
are wrong-only if the hearings on Judge Bork ought to serve
less as a warning than as a model-that we now may have a
mess to clean up.
III. CRITIQUING CARTER

What, then, of Carter's vision of the confirmation process?
Should participants in the process accede to Carter's view of how
to select a Supreme Court Justice? Or should they adopt a different, even an opposite, model?
One preliminary clarification is necessary. Carter's argument

The margin of victory would have increased yet further had Thomas not made controversial statements, before his nomination, on subjects such as abortion and affirmative
action. Carter is unclear as to whether (or how) participants in the confirmation process
ought to take account of such prenomination statements. If Carter does approve of an
evaluation of the substantive views expressed by a nominee in prior speeches or writings,
then virtually all of the votes cast against Justice Thomas would have derived from the
consideration of factors that Carter himself deems relevant to the process.
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against a Bork-like confirmation process focuses entirely on the
scope of the inquiry, not at all on the identity (executive or legislative) of the inquirer. This is an important point because other
critics of the Bork hearings have rested their case on a distinction between the roles of the President and the Senate; they have
argued that in assessing the substantive views of the nominee,
the Senate ought to defer to the PresidentY Carter (I think
rightly) rejects this claim, adopting instead the position that the
Senate and the President have independent responsibility to
evaluate, by whatever criteria are appropriate, whether a person
ought to serve as a Supreme Court Justice.' Carter's argument
concerns the criteria that the participants-that is, all the participants-in the confirmation process ought to use to make this
decision. It is thus Carter's contention not merely that the Senate
ought to forgo inquiry into a nominee's legal views and philosophy, but also that the President ought to do so-in short, that
such inquiry, by whomever conducted, crosses the bounds of
propriety. (And although Carter does not address the issue, his
arguments apply almost equally well to an investigation of the
views expressed in a person's written record as to an inquiry into
the person's views by means of an oral examination.)
This analysis raises some obvious questions. If substantive
inquiry is off-limits, on what basis will the President and Senate
exercise their respective roles in the appointments process? Will
this limited basis prove sufficient to evaluate and determine
whether a nominee (or would-be nominee) should sit on the
Court? Will an inquiry conducted on this basis appropriately
educate and engage the public as to the Court's decisions and
functions? Some closer exploration of Carter's views, as they
relate to this set of issues, will illustrate at once the inadequacy
of his proposals and the necessity for substantive inquiry of nominees, most notably in Senate hearings.
Carter argues that both the President and the Senate ought
to pay close attention to a nominee's (or a prospective nominee's)

' See, for example, John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution,
and the ConfirmationProcess:A Reply to ProfessorsStrauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex L Rev
633, 636, 653-54 (1993).
2
This position has become common in the literature on the confirmation process. See
David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L J 1491 (1992). See also Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on
Senatorial Considerationof Supreme Court Nominees, 79 Yale L J 657 (1970). Because
Carter and I agree on the issue, and because the relevant arguments have been stated
fully elsewhere, this Review addresses the issue only indirectly.
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objective qualifications. There may be, as Carter notes, some
disagreement as to what these are (pp 161-62). Must, for example
(as Carter previously has argued2 5 ), a nominee have served on
another appellate court-or may (as I believe) she demonstrate
the requisite intelligence and legal ability through academic
scholarship, the practice of law, or governmental service of some
other kind? Carter writes that we must form a consensus on
these issues and then rigorously apply it-so that the Senate, for
example, could reject a nomination on the simple ground that the
nominee lacks the qualifications to do the job (p 162). On this
point, Carter surely is right. It is an embarrassment that the
President and Senate do not always insist, as a threshold requirement, that a nominee's previous accomplishments evidence
an ability not merely to handle but to master the "craft" aspects
of being a judge. In this respect President Clinton's appointments
stand as models. No one can say of his nominees, as no one ought
to be able to say of any, that they lack the training, skills, and
aptitude to do the work of a judge at the highest level.
But Carter cannot think-and on occasion reveals he does
not think-that legal ability alone ought to govern, or as a practical matter could govern, either the President's or the Senate's
decision. If there was once a time when we all could agree on the
single "best" nominee-as, some say, all agreed on Cardozo-that
time is long past, given the nature of the work the Supreme
Court long has accomplished. As Carter himself concedes, most of
the cases the Supreme Court hears require more than the application of "mundane and lawyerly" skills; these cases raise "questions requir[ing] judgment in the finding of answers, and in every
exercise of interpretive judgment, there comes a crucial moment
when the interpreter's own experience and values become the
most important data" (p 151). Carter offers as examples flag
burning, segregated schools, and executive power (p 151), and he
could offer countless more; it should be no surprise by now that
many of the votes a Supreme Court Justice casts have little to do
with technical legal ability and much to do with conceptions of
value. Imagine our response if President Clinton had announced
that he had chosen his most recent nominee to the Supreme
Court by conducting a lottery among Richard Posner, Stephen
Breyer, and Laurence Tribe because they seemed to him the
nation's three smartest lawyers. If we are all realists now, as the
saying goes, it is in the sense that we understand a choice among

2

See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 Harv L Rev 1185, 1188 (1988).
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these three to have large consequences and that we would view a
lottery among them as demonstrating a deficient understanding
of the judicial process.
Carter recommends, in light of the importance of a judge's
values, that the President and Senate augment their inquiry into
a person's legal ability with an investigation of the person's morality. He says that "[tihe issue, finally, is... what sort of person
the nominee happens to be" (p 151); and he asks the President
and Senate to determine whether a person "possess[es] the right
moral instincts" by investigating whether her "personal moral
decisions seem generally sound" (p 152). Here, too, it is easy to
agree with Carter that this trait ought to play some role in the
appointments process. Moral character, and the individual acts
composing it, matter for two reasons (although Carter does not
disentangle them). First, elevating a person who commits acts of
personal misconduct (for example, sexual harassment) to the
highest legal position in the nation sends all the wrong messages
about the conduct that we as a society value and honor. Second,
moral character, as Carter recognizes, sometimes will be "brought
to bear on concrete cases," so that "the morally superior individual" may also "be the morally superior jurist," in the sense that
her decisions will have a "salutary rather than destructive effect
on the Court and the country" (p 153).
But focusing the confirmation process on moral character
(even in conjunction with legal ability) would prove a terrible
error. For one thing, such a focus would aggravate, rather than
ease, the meanness that Carter rightly sees as marring the confirmation process (and, one might add, much of our politics). The
"second" hearing on Clarence Thomas ought to have taught at
least that lesson. When the subject is personal character, rather
than legal principle, the probability, on all sides, of using gutter
tactics exponentially increases. There are natural limits on the
extent to which debate over legal positions can become vicious,
hurtful, or sordid-but few on the extent to which discussion of
personal conduct can descend to this level.
More important, an investigation of moral character will
reveal very little about the values that matter most in the enterprise of judging. What makes the Richard Posner different from
the Stephen Breyer different from the Laurence Tribe is not
moral character or behavior, in the sense meant by Carter; I am
reasonably sure that each of these persons is, in his personal life
and according to Carter's standard, a morally exemplary individual. What causes them to differ as constitutional interpreters is
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something if not completely, then at least partly, severable from
personal morality: divergent understandings of the values embodied in the Constitution and the proper role of judges in giving
effect to those values. Disagreement on these matters can cause
(and has caused), among the most personally upright of judges,
disagreement on every concrete question of constitutional law,
including (or especially) the most important. It is therefore difficult to understand why we would make personal moral standards
the focal point of a decision either to nominate or to confirm a
person as a Supreme Court Justice."
What must guide any such decision, stated most broadly, is a
vision of the Court and an understanding of the way a nominee
would influence its behavior. This vision largely consists of a
view as to the kinds of decisions the Court should issue. The
critical inquiry as to any individual similarly concerns the votes
she would cast, the perspective she would add (or augment), and
the direction in which she would move the institution." I do not
mean to say that the promotion of "craft values"-the building of
a Court highly skilled in legal writing and reasoning and also
finely attuned to pertinent theoretical issues-is at all unimportant. Justice Scalia by now has challenged and amused a
decade's worth of law professors, which is no small thing if that
is your profession; more seriously, the quality and intelligence
(even if ultimate wrong-headedness) of much of Justice Scalia's
work has instigated a debate that in the long run can only advance legal inquiry. But the bottom-line issue in the appointments process must concern the kinds of judicial decisions that
will serve the country and, correlatively, the effect the nominee
will have on the Court's decisions. If that is too results oriented

' It is also true that a person may engage in immoral behavior without allowing that
immorality to influence his judicial decision making. Our government is replete with
womanizers who always vote in sympathy with the goal of sexual equality; our Court has
seen a former Ku Klux Klan member who well understood the constitutional evil of stateimposed racism. Perhaps the (im)moral conduct in these cases is all that matters; perhaps, in any event, we ought to rely on the (im)moral conduct as a solid, even if not a
foolproof, indicator of future judicial behavior. But consideration of these cases may increase further our reluctance to make moral character the critical determinant of confirmation decisions.
' The President and Senate thus ought to evaluate the nominee (or potential nominee) in the context of the larger institution she would join if confirmed. They are not
choosing a judge who will staff the Supreme Court alone; they are choosing a judge who
will act and interact with eight other members. The qualities desirable in a nominee may
take on a different cast when this fact is remembered. Most obviously, the benefits of
diversity of viewpoint become visible only when the nominee is viewed as just one member of a larger body.
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in Carter's"schema, so be it-though even he notes that a critical
question is whether the Court's decisions will have a "salutary"
or a "destructive" impact on the country (p 153). It is indeed hard
to know how to evaluate a governmental institution, or the individuals who compose it, except by the effect of their actions (or
their refusals to take action) on the welfare of society.
If this is so, then the Senate's consideration of a nominee,
and particularly the Senate's confirmation hearings, ought to
focus on substantive issues; the Senate ought to view the hearings as an opportunity to gain knowledge and promote public
understanding of what the nominee believes the Court should do
and how she would affect its conduct. Like other kinds of legislative fact-finding, this inquiry serves both to educate members of
the Senate and public and to enhance their ability to make reasoned choices. Open exploration of the nominee's substantive
views, that is, enables senators and their constitutuents to engage in a focused discussion of constitutional values, to ascertain
the values held by the nominee, and to evaluate whether the
nominee possesses the values that the Supreme Court most urgently requires. These are the issues of greatest consequence
surrounding any Supreme Court nomination (not the objective
qualifications or personal morality of the nominee); and the process used in the Senate to serve the intertwined aims of education and evaluation ought to reflect what most greatly matters.'
At least this is true in the absence of any compelling reasons, of
prudence or propriety, to the contrary; later I will argue, as
against Carter, that such reasons are nowhere evident.
The kind of inquiry that would contribute most to understanding and evaluating a nomination is the kind Carter would
forbid: discussion first, of the nominee's broad judicial philosophy
and, second, of her views on particular constitutional issues. By
"judicial philosophy" (a phrase Carter berates without explanation), I mean such things as the judge's understanding of the role
of courts in our society, of the nature of and values embodied in
our Constitution, and of the proper tools and techniques of interpretation, both constitutional and statutory. A nominee's views
on these matters could prove quite revealing: contrast, for example, how Antonin Scalia and Thurgood Marshall would have answered these queries, had either decided (which neither did) to

28

To structure the process to avoid these issues would be akin to enacting a piece of

legislation without trying to figure out or explain the legislation's principal consequences.
I presume that no one would commend such an approach generally to Congress.
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share his thoughts with the Senate. But responses to such questions can-and have-become platitudinous, especially given the
interrogators' scant familiarity with jurisprudential matters.'
And even when a nominee avoids this vice, her statements of
judicial philosophy may be so abstract as to leave uncertain,
especially to the public, much about their real-world consequences. Hence the second aspect of the inquiry: the insistence
on seeing how theory works in practice by evoking a nominee's
comments on particular issues-involving privacy rights, free
speech, race and gender discrimination, and so forth-that the
Court regularly faces. It is, after all, how the Court functions
with respect to such issues that makes it, in Carter's words,
either a "salutary" or a "destructive" institution.
A focus on substance in fact would cure some of the
deficiencies in the confirmation process that Carter pinpoints.
Carter says that the process turns "tiny ethical molehills into
vast mountains of outrage" (p 8)-and he is right that we have
seen these transformations. To note but one example, the amount
of heat generated by a few senators (and the New York Times)
concerning Justice Breyer's recusal practices far exceeded the
significance of the issue. But this occurs precisely because we
have left ourselves with nothing else to talk about. Rather than
feeling able to confront directly the question whether Justice
Breyer was too moderate, Senator Metzenbaum (and likewise the
New York Times) fumed about an issue not nearly so important,
either to them or to the public. Carter also says that participants
in the process have attempted to paint nominees (particularly
Judge Bork) as "radical monster[s]-far outside the mainstream
of both morality and law" (p 127). But assuming, as seems true,
that senators and others at times have engaged in distortion-it
would be surprising if they hadn't-the marginalization of substantive inquiry that Carter favors only would encourage this
practice. If evaluating (and perhaps rejecting) a nominee on the

2

Carter often takes senators to task for failing to question nominees on constitution-

al theory with the appropriate level of sophistication and nuance. Although there is some
truth to this criticism, it is mixed in Carter's account with a healthy measure of professorial condescension. Given the need to explain matters of constitutional theory to the
public, at least a few senators do quite well. To the extent Carter's criticism has merit,
the real problem is that senators now can expect answers only to high-blown questions of
constitutional theory. Senators wander in the unfamiliar ground of constitutional theory
because they cannot gain access to the real, and very familiar, world of decisions and
consequences. See Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw U L Rev 858,
863 (1990) ("Senators are certainly qualified to consider the impact of the law's abstractions.").
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basis of her substantive positions is appropriate only in the most
exceptional cases, then the natural opponents of a nomination
will have every incentive to-indeed, will need to-characterize
the nominee as a "radical monster." The way to promote reasoned
debate thus lies not in submerging substantive issues, but in
making them the centerpiece of the confirmation process.
Further, a commitment to address substantive issues need
not especially disadvantage scholars and others who have left a
"paper trail," as the received wisdom intones and Carter accepts
(p 38). The conventional view is that substantive inquiry promotes substantive ciphers; hence the hearings on Robert Bork led
to the nomination of David Souter. But this occurs only because
the cipher is allowed to remain so-only because substantive
questioning is reserved for nominees who somehow have "opened
the door" to it by once having committed a thought to paper. If
questioning on substantive positions ever were to become the
norm, the nominee lacking a publication record would have no
automatic advantage over a highly prolific author. The success of
a nomination in each case would depend on the nominee's views,
whether or not previously expressed in a law review or federal
reporter. Indeed, a confirmation process devoted to substantive
inquiry might favor nominees with a paper trail, all else being
equal. If there was any reason for the Senate to have permitted
the testimonial demurrals of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, it
was that their views already were widely known, in large part
through scholarship and reported opinions-and that those views
were widely perceived as falling within the appropriate range.
When this is so, extended questioning on legal issues may seem
hardly worth the time and effort. 31 More available writing thus
might lead to less required testimony in a confirmation process
committed to substantive inquiry.
Finally, a confirmation process focused on substantive views
usually will not violate, in the way Carter claims, norms of judi-

'o

The value of questioning in such circumstances is almost purely educative; the

inquiry is a means not of discovering what the nominee thinks, in order to decide whether
confirmation is warranted, but instead of conveying to members of the public what the
nominee thinks, in order to give them both an understanding of the Court and a sense of
participating in its composition. This function is itself important, see text accompanying
note 28; it may provide a reason for holding substantive hearings even when senators can
make, and have made, a decision as to a nominee's views prior to asking a single question
(as senators could have and, for the most part, did about the views of Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg). The need for such hearings, however, is much greater when (as was true for
Justices Souter and Thomas) the prior record and writings of the nominee leave real
uncertainty as to the nominee's legal philosophy.
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cial impartiality or independence. Carter's "blank slate" notion of
impartiality of judgment--"appointing Justices who make up
their minds about how to vote before they hear any arguments
rather than after is a threat," fusses Carter (p 56)-is an especial
red herring. Judges are not partial in deciding cases because they
have strong opinions, or previously have expressed strong opinions, on issues involved in those cases. If they were, the Supreme
Court would have to place, say, Justice Scalia in a permanent
state of recusal, given that in the corpus of his judicial opinions
he has stated unequivocal views on every subject of any importance. And the Senate would have had to reject, on this ground
alone, the nomination of Justice Ginsburg, who not only had
written about abortion rights 1-- perhaps the most contentious
issue in contemporary constitutional law-but who testified in
even stronger terms as to her current views on that issue. 2
That both suggestions are absurd indicates that we do not yet,
thankfully enough, consider either the possession or the expression of views on legal issues-even when strongly held and stated-to be a judicial disqualification.
As for "judicial independence," Carter speaks as though the
term were self-defining-and as though it meant that in appointing judges to a court, the President and Senate must refrain from
considering what they will do once they arrive there. But this
would be an odd kind of decision to leave in the hands of elected
officials: far better, if such subjects were forbidden, to allow
judges to name their own successors-or to cede the appointment
power to some ABA committee. In fact, the placement of this
decision in the political branches says something about its nature-says something, in particular, about its connection to the
real-world consequences of judicial behavior. Indeed, contrary to
Carter's view, the President and Senate themselves have a constitutional obligation to consider how an individual, as a judge,
will read the Constitution: that is one part of what it means to
preserve and protect the founding instrument. The value of judicial independence does not command otherwise, however much
Carter tries to convert this concept into a thought-suppressing
mantra. The judicial independence that we should focus on protecting resides primarily in the inability of political officials, once
having placed a person on a court, to interfere with what she

", See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375 (1985).
32 See, for example, Confirmation Hearings for Ginsburg at 268-69 (cited in note 5).
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does there. That seems a fair amount of independence for any
branch of government.
I do not mean to argue here that the President and Senate
may ask, and a nominee (or potential nominee) must answer, any
question whatsoever. Some kinds of questions, as Carter contends, do pose a threat to the integrity of the judiciary. Suppose,
for example, that a senator asked a nominee to commit herself to
voting a certain way on a case that the Court had accepted for
argument. We would object-and we would be right to object-to
this question, on the ground that any commitment of this kind,
even though unenforceable, would place pressure on the judge
(independent of the merits of the case) to rule in a certain manner. This would impede the judge's ability to make a free and
considered decision in the case, as well as undermine the credibility of the decision in the eyes of litigants and the public. And
once we accept the impermissibility of such a question, it seems
we have to go still further. For there are ways of requesting and
making commitments that manage to circumvent the language of
pledge and promise, but that convey the same meaning; and
these scantly veiled expressions pose dangers almost as grave as
those of explicit commitments to the fairness, actual and perceived, of the judicial process.
But we do not have to proceed nearly so far down the road of
silence as Carter and recent nominees would take us-to a place
where comment of any kind on any issue that might bear in any
way on any case that might at any time come before the Court is
thought inappropriate." There is a difference between a prohibition on making a commitment (whether explicit or implicit) and
a prohibition on stating a current view as to a disputed legal
question. The most recent drafters of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct acknowledged just this distinction when they adopted
the former prohibition in place of the latter for candidates for
judicial office.' Of course, there will be hard cases-cases in
which reasonable people may disagree as to whether a nominee's
statement of opinion manifests a settled intent to decide in a

3 For a similar conclusion, see Steven Lubet, Advice and Consent: Questions and Answers, 84 Nw U L Rev 879 (1990).
4 See pp 96-97. Compare Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (1990),
with Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972). See generally Buckley v Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F2d 224, 230 (7th Cir 1993) (Judge Posner noting the difference between these two kinds of prohibitions and holding the broader prohibition, on
"announc[ing] ... views on disputed legal or political issues," to violate the First Amendment).
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particular manner a particular case likely to come before the
Court. But many easy cases precede the hard ones: a nominee
can say a great, great deal before making a statement that, under this standard, nears the improper. A nominee, as I have indicated before, usually can comment on judicial methodology, on
prior caselaw, on hypothetical cases, on general issues like affirmative action or abortion. To make this more concrete, a nominee
can do... well, what Robert Bork did. If Carter and recent nominees are right, Judge Bork's testimony violated many times a
crucial norm of judicial conduct. In fact, it did no such thing;
indeed it should serve as a model.
Return for a moment to those hearings, in which the Senate-and the American people-evaluated Robert Bork's fitness.
Carter stresses the distortion, exaggeration, and vilification that
occurred during the debate on the nomination. And surely these
were present-most notably, as Carter notes, in the misdescription of Bork's opinion in American Cyanimid 5 But the most
striking aspect of the debate over the Bork nomination was not
the depths to which it occasionally descended, but the heights
that it repeatedly reached. 8 What Carter tongue-in-cheek calls
"the famous national seminar on constitutional law" (p 6) was
just that. The debate focused not on trivialities (Carter's "ethical
molehills") but on essentials: the understanding of the Constitution that the nominee would carry with him to the Court. Senators addressed this complex subject with a degree of seriousness
and care not usually present in legislative deliberation; the ratio
of posturing and hyperbole to substantive discussion was much
lower than that to which the American citizenry has become
accustomed. And the debate captivated and involved that citizenry in a way that, given the often arcane nature of the subject
matter, could not have been predicted. Constitutional law became, for that brief moment, not a project reserved for judges,
but an enterprise to which the general public turned its attention
and contributed.
Granted that not all subsequent confirmation hearings could,
or even should, follow the pattern set by the Bork hearings, in either their supercharged intensity or their attention to substance.
A necessary condition of both was the extreme conservatism of
Bork's known views, which made him an object of terror to some

3
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Intl. Union v American Cyanimid Co., 741 F2d
444 (DC Cir 1984).
' For a similar view, see Strauss, Am Prospect at 94 (cited in note 19).
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senators and veneration to others. It would be difficult to imagine
hearings of the same kind following the nomination of Justice
Ginsburg or Justice Breyer-two well-known moderates whose
nominations had been proposed by senators on both sides of the
aisle. To insist that these hearings take the identical form as the
hearings on Judge Bork is not only to blink at political reality,
but also to ignore the very real differences in the nature of the
nominations.
But that said, the real "confirmation mess" is the gap that
has opened between the Bork hearings and all others (not only
for Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, but also, and perhaps especially, for Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas). It is the degree to
which the Senate has strayed from the Bork model. The Bork
hearings presented to the public a serious discussion of the
meaning of the Constitution, the role of the Court, and the views
of the nominee; that discussion at once educated the public and
allowed it to determine whether the nominee would move the
Court in the proper direction. Subsequent hearings have presented to the public a vapid and hollow charade, in which repetition
of platitudes has replaced discussion of viewpoints and personal
anecdotes have supplanted legal analysis. Such hearings serve
little educative function, except perhaps to reinforce lessons of
cynicism that citizens often glean from government. Neither can
such hearings contribute toward an evaluation of the Court and a
determination whether the nominee would make it a better or
worse institution. A process so empty may seem ever so tidy-muted, polite, and restrained-but all that good order comes
at great cost.
And what is worse even than the hearings themselves is a
necessary condition of them: the evident belief of many senators
that serious substantive inquiry of nominees is usually not only
inessential, but illegitimate-that their insistent questioning of
Judge Bork was justified, if at all, by his overt "radicalism" and
that a similar insistence with respect to other nominees, not so
obviously "outside the mainstream," would be improper. This
belief is not so often or so clearly stated; but it underlies all that
the Judiciary Committee now does with respect to Supreme
Court nominations. It is one reason that senators accede to the
evasive answers they now have received from five consecutive
nominees. It is one reason that senators emphasize, even in posing questions, that they are asking the nominee only about philosophy and not at all about cases-in effect, inviting the nominee to spout legal theory, but to spurn any demonstration of
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what that theory might mean in practice. It is one reason that
senators often act as if their inquiry were a presumption-as if
they, mere politicians, have no right to ask a real lawyer (let
alone a real judge) about what the law should look like and how
it should work. What has happened is that the Senate has absorbed criticisms like Carter's and, in so doing, has let slip the
fundamental lesson of the Bork hearings: the essential rightness-the legitimacy and the desirability-of exploring a Supreme Court nominee's set of constitutional views and commitments.
The real confirmation mess, in short, is the absence of the
mess that Carter describes. The problem is not that the Bork
hearings have set a pattern for all others; the problem is that
they have not. And the problem is not that senators engage in
substantive discussion with Supreme Court nominees; the problem is that they do not. Senators effectively have accepted the
limits on inquiry Carter proposes; the challenge now is to overthrow them.
In some sense, Carter is right that we will clean up the mess
only when we change "our attitudes toward the Court as an institution"-when we change the way we "view the Court" (p 188).
But as he misdescribes the mess, so too does Carter misapprehend the needed attitudinal adjustment. We should not persuade
ourselves, as Carter urges, to view the Court as a "mundane and
lawyerly" institution and to view the position of Justice as "simply a job" (pp 205-06). We must instead remind ourselves to view
the Court as the profoundly important governmental institution
that, for good or for ill, it has become and, correlatively, to view
the position of Justice as both a seat of power and a public trust.
It is from this realistic, rather than Carter's nostalgic, vision of
the Court that sensible reform of the confirmation process one
day will come. And such reform, far from blurring a nominee's
judicial philosophy and views, will bring them into greater focus.

